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Abstract
Contemporary policy debates on the macroeconomics of aid often concentrate
on short-run Dutch disease eﬀects, ignoring the possible supply side impact of aid—
ﬁnanced public expenditure. We develop a simple model of aid and public expendi-
ture in which public infrastructure capital generates an inter-temporal productivity
spillover for both tradable and non-tradable sectors, where these productivity ef-
fects may display sector-speciﬁc biases. The model also allows for non-homothetic
demands. We then use an extended version of this model, calibrated to contem-
porary conditions in Uganda, to simulate the eﬀect of a step increase in net aid
ﬂows. Our simulations show that beyond the short-run, where Dutch disease eﬀects
are present, the relationship between enhanced aid ﬂows, real exchange rates and
welfare is less straightforward than simple models of aid suggest. We show that
public infrastructure which generates a productivity bias in favour of non-tradable
production delivers the largest aggregate return to aid, with the real exchange rate
appreciation reduced or reversed and enhanced export performance, but it does
so at the cost of a deterioration in the income distribution. Income gains accrue
predominantly to urban skilled and unskilled households, leaving the rural poor
relatively worse oﬀ. Under plausible parameterizations of the model the rural poor
may also be worse oﬀ in absolute terms.
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11. Introduction
In recent years patterns of aid allocations have begun to change in ways that anticipate
as i g n i ﬁcant concentration of aid on a small number of recipients. These changes
themselves reﬂect a number of factors including the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) debt relief initiative, pressures for increased country selectivity in aid allocations
(for example, Collier and Dollar, 2002), as well as speciﬁc initiatives aimed at increasing
net aid ﬂows to selected low-income countries1.H a n di nh a n dw i t ht h e s ed e v e l o p m e n t s
has come a heightened anxiety amongst both donors and potential recipients that such
initiatives may jeopardize their economic recovery. Not surprisingly, these concerns are
most acute in already aid-dependent countries, such as Uganda, where their recent track-
record on growth, policy reform and poverty reduction has ensured they are best placed
to take advantage of the donors’ willingness to increase aid in support of higher levels of
public expenditure. In part this anxiety reﬂects reservations about the absorptive and
managerial capacity of over-stretched public sectors to deliver higher public expenditure,
a n di np a r ti tr e ﬂects deeper reservations about aid dependency and the impact of
foreign aid on the domestic political economy (for example, Adam and O’Connell (1999),
Svensson (2000)). However, more traditional concerns about the macroeconomics of aid
also ﬁgure large, and it is on these that this paper focuses.
Dominating these is the fear that the Dutch disease eﬀects of aid will inhibit the
development of the tradable goods sector and lower growth in the recipient economy.
Research in this area has tended to focus on the tax-like distortion of aid or resource dis-
coveries on the competitiveness of the tradable sector, typically where the latter enjoys
learning-by-doing productivity eﬀects (for example, van Wijnbergen (1984), Sachs and
Warner (1995), Gylafson et al (1997), Elbadawi (1999), Adam and O’Connell (2003)).
Recently, Torvik (2001) has shown that the conventional Dutch disease eﬀects may be
overturned if there are productivity spillovers in both tradable and non-tradable sec-
tors. The model presented in this paper arrives at a similar conclusion but does so by
focussing on an arguably more plausible dynamic mechanism, at least for low-income
countries. To be precise, we examine the case where public infrastructure investment —
of the type envisaged under the current aid dispensation — generates an inter-temporal
productivity spillover for both tradable and non-tradable production, but in a poten-
tially unbalanced manner. For example public investment in rural roads is likely to
impact more on the production of (non-tradable) food crops than on urban-based (trad-
able) manufactures and vice versa for, say, telecommunications infrastructure. This
diﬀerential eﬀect can, and generally will, deliver growth and real exchange rate eﬀects
similar to those suggested by Torvik (2001).
1For example the G8’s endorsement of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in
July 2002, and the report of the World Health Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health in December 2001.The second source of concern is that the distributional eﬀects of higher public ex-
penditure may run counter to inequality and poverty reduction objectives. There are
two elements here. The ﬁrst is that the immediate beneﬁciaries of higher public ex-
penditure tend to be the non-poor working in the services and manufacturing sectors
as opposed to the poor who are predominantly engaged in food and cash crop produc-
tion. The second is that even if public expenditure is devoted to infrastructure that
enhances productivity in the non-tradable sector the distribution of aggregate income
may move against net producers of non-tradables and hence, to the extent that the poor
are located in these sectors, worsen the distribution of income. We show that this is
a distinct possibility in circumstances where preferences are non-homothetic and the
income elasticity of demand for non-tradable output (in this case basic food) is low.2
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline a simple two-sector,
two-good model to analyze these Dutch disease eﬀects in the presence of aid-ﬁnanced
public infrastructure investment. This model is highly stylized and so in Section 3 we
present a simulation model of Uganda to oﬀer a sense of the possible magnitudes likely to
prevail in reality, and to focus on the distributional consequences arising from alternative
aid and public expenditure choices. To do so we disaggregate on the production and
consumption sides of the economy, bring in private savings and investment, and allow
for diﬀerentiated households to give meaning to distributional considerations which are
not reﬂected in the model of Section 2. We then simulate the medium-term eﬀects of
alternative aid-ﬁnanced increases in public expenditure based on the recent experience
in Uganda. Section 4 discusses the simulation results and Section 5 concludes. Our
results suggest that for reasonable parameter values governing the supply-side response
to public expenditure, traditional Dutch disease eﬀects are not present beyond the
short-run. Rather, it appears that for low-income countries with a structure similar to
that of contemporary Uganda, public expenditure whose productivity eﬀects are skewed
towards the non-tradable sector delivers the highest growth in exports and total output
and sustains the highest aggregate real income. The model also highlights important
distributional tensions which disadvantage rural households relative to urban households
and which may even lead to an absolute decline in rural incomes.
2. A simple model of productivity spillovers
We consider a two-period Ricardo-Viner model of a small open economy that produces
and consumes a non-traded good and a traded good. Private capital stocks are ﬁxed and
2Matsuyama (1992) uses the assumption of non-homothetic preferences and a low income elasticity
of demand for agricultural output in a traditional endogenous growth framework to analyse the link
between agricultural productivity and growth. That structure delivers the result that in a closed econ-
omy increased agricultural productivity will have a positive eﬀect on industrialization (growth) but the
eﬀect will be reversed if the economy is open to trade.sector-speciﬁc (and do not depreciate), and a ﬁxed endowment L of labor moves freely
between sectors to equalize real consumption wages. The economy faces ﬁxed external
terms of trade and there are no tariﬀs or taxes. Aid, represented by a fully fungible
transfer of (tradable) resources, is the only international capital ﬂow in the model. To
focus on the mechanisms of interest, we assume that aid is received in the ﬁrst period
only, although in the simulation model in Section 3 we ﬁnd it more appropriate to treat
the aid ﬂow as permanent. Total aggregate expenditure consists of private expenditure
on tradable and non-tradable goods, and public expenditure on infrastructure. Total
income derives from domestic production plus the exogenous aid ﬂow.
We express all values in terms of tradable goods, the price of which is normalized
so that PT =1 . Hence deﬁning the real exchange rate PN/PT = Q , and using the
superscripts P and G to denote private and government expenditure, we can express
the ﬁrst period income-expenditure balance as
EP(Q,U)+EG(Q,K)=R(Q;L)+A (1)
where where A is aid, U is private utility and K is public infrastructure capital.
EP(Q,U) , EG(Q,K) and R(Q;L) represent private and public expenditure and rev-
enue functions respectively. Letting the supply and compensated demand functions for
non-traded goods be RQ , EP
Q and EG
Q respectively, we obtain the ﬁrst-period market




Equations (1) and (2) imply that the trade balance is equal to exogenously given aid
ﬂows, thus: EP
T (Q,U)+EG
T (Q,K) − RT(Q;L)=A. Finally we deﬁne the government
budget constraint as
EG(Q,K)=A. (3)
The government’s role in this model is simply the conversion of donor aid into public
infrastructure. Since infrastructure is composed of tradable and non-tradable goods,
the actual quantity of public investment realized will depend on the real exchange rate
and the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods in investment
demand.3 Public investment takes place in the ﬁrst period (at ﬁrst period prices) but
augments productive capacity in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors only in the
second period.
This completes the characterization of the ﬁrst period. Using lower-case letters to
denote second-period values, we assume that ﬁr m si nb o t hs e c t o r sm a ye n j o yp r o d u c t i v -
ity gains from public infrastructure investment, and that if forthcoming these are sector
3At this stage we impose no prior on this elaticity, although in the simulation model in Section 3 we
assume a Leontief structure for investment demand.speciﬁc but not appropriable by individual ﬁrms. Production in period two therefore
depends on the real exchange rate, q, and the size of the public capital stock K installed




where the value of the marginal product of infrastructure capital is given by rK =
qrqK + rtK.
First Period Equilibrium Given the characterization of the government’s behav-
iour, public capital formation is the only inter-temporal spillover in this simple model.
Hence equations (1), (2), and (3) fully determine the ﬁrst period equilibrium. Totally
diﬀerentiating these three equations we arrive at the following expressions for the pro-
portional change in the real exchange rate, private utility and public infrastructure in










































EQ is total (private plus government) demand for non-tradables, and ΣQQ > 0,∆P
QQ < 0
and ∆G
QQ < 0 are the real-exchange rate elasticities of supply and (private and govern-
ment) demand for non-tradables respectively. The three parameters, φ,γ and η describe
the composition of government expenditure, as follows: φ is the share of government
expenditure in total expenditure and γ is the share of government expenditure on non-
tradables in total expenditure, so that (γ/φ) is the non-tradable share in government
expenditure; and η is its share in the total demand for non-tradables. ΛPand ΛG denote
the (uncompensated) income elasticities of demand for non-tradables of the public and
private sectors respectively.Expressions (7) to (9) deliver the standard demand-side Dutch-disease results. First,
notice that unless ΛP is very large relative to ΛG, ΣQQ and ∆QQ , the expression B
will be positive; letting ∆QQ =( 1− η)∆P
QQ + η∆G
QQ be the overall real exchange rate














(ΣQQ − ∆QQ). (11)
Hence for reasonable values, an increase in aid will appreciate the real exchange rate
and will increase ﬁrst period private welfare. The latter result may at ﬁrst seem
counterintuitive but, as can be seen immediately from equation (A4) in the Appendix,
it arises from the fact that the private sector is a net seller of the non-tradable good
to the public sector so that the aid-induced real exchange rate appreciation generates a
favourable movement in the private-public terms of trade. Finally, aid will succeed in






(ΣQQ − ∆QQ). (12)
Assuming ΛG > 0, this is a stricter condition than that required for increased aid to
appreciate the real exchange rate and increase private welfare although, for the reasons
noted in footnote 4, this condition will be satisﬁed in most circumstances.
In all three cases the magnitude of these eﬀects is determined by the behavioural
structure of the economy. Consider, for example, the responsiveness of the real ex-
change rate to the aid inﬂow (equation (7)). Here the degree of appreciation moderates
the higher are ΣQQ,∆P
QQ and ∆G
QQ (in absolute value) but increases with the private
and government income elasticities of demand for non-tradables.5 A similar set of com-
parative static results can be derived for the private welfare and public expenditure
eﬀects of aid. Since these are not of central importance in this paper we do not discuss
them here.
It is worth noting, however, that if public investment is entirely composed of trad-






EK, in other words that the aid inﬂow has no consequences for the ﬁrst-period
real exchange rate or private utility and that public capital increases in direct proportion
to the aid inﬂow.
4In the simulation model below γ ≈ 0.10 and η ≈ 0.125 and φ ≈ 0.20 so that the second term on
the right hand side will be around nine times the sum of the real exchange rate demand and supply
elasticities. Since it is reasonable to expect that in fact Λ
P will be less than unity then even if Λ
G were
low B will be positive.
5In the case of the private sector expenditure elasticity the eﬀect is unambiguous; in the case of the
government elasticity, the responsiveness of the real exchange rate elasticity is increasing in Λ
G provided
condition (12) is satisﬁed.Notice, also, that if there is no public investment response to the aid inﬂow (so that
EG(.)=0in (1) and aid resources accrue directly to the private sector as an income











which conﬁrm the simple demand-side results of a pure consumption transfer which
emerge from any standard model (for example Devarajan et al, 1993). In this case
the aid ﬂow is strictly welfare increasing and will, unambiguously, appreciate the real
exchange rate, with the extent of the appreciation being determined by the income
elasticity of demand and the elasticities of demand and supply in the non-tradable
sector.
Second-Period Equilibrium The second period equilibrium is derived in an anal-
ogous fashion by totally diﬀerentiating (4) and (5) to solve for dq and du in terms of
dK and the productivity of investment in the two sectors as follows.6 Noting that
rK = qrqK + rtK and letting θ = qeq/e be the share of non-tradables in total expendi-





and the second-period real exchange rate
ˆ q =
[(θλp − 1)qrqK + θλprtK]dK
qeq(σqq − δqq)
(16)
where, following the procedure deﬁned in Appendix 1, λp is the second-period private
sector income elasticity of demand for non-tradables, and σqq > 0 and δqq < 0 are the
second period real exchange rate elasticities of supply and (private sector) demand for
non-tradables, respectively.7
6We express the results which follow in terms of dK, the increase in public infrastructure, rather than
solving out for dK from (9) since from the perspective of period 2 the relationship between the original
aid ﬂow and the volume of additional infrastructure it ﬁnanced is immaterial. Though we choose not
to do so, it would be a simple matter to to solve the donor’s optimal aid allocation as a function of the
second-period productivity given the donor’s welfare function and budget constraint.
7Notice that we could derive the same result by solving (3) and (5). In this instance equation (16)
would take the form
ˆ q =
[((1 − θ)λ




pt is the second period income elasticity of demand for tradables, and σtq < 0 and δtq > 0 the
second-period real exchange rate elasticities of supply and demand for tradables.Three key results emerge from the above. The ﬁr s ti st h a ti nt h i sm o d e lt h e
change in second period utility depends on the value of the aggregate product of public
capital; it does not depend on the presence or absence of any bias in productivity.
Second, and by contrast, the evolution of the real exchange depends on the scale of
infrastructure investment and the relative bias in productivity spillover between the
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Thus, noting that (σqq −δqq) > 0 it follows that the
higher the impact on non-tradable (tradable) productivity the more likely is the real
exchange rate to depreciate (appreciate). Third, these eﬀects are moderated by the
income elasticity of the demand for non-tradables. For given values of rqK and rtK,t h e
lower the income elasticity, λp, the weaker the tendency for the real exchange rate to
appreciate. Speciﬁcally, solving (16) it follows that








If productivity is exactly balanced, in the sense that qrqK = rtK condition (17) simpliﬁes
to




In the simulation model in the following section we consider only ‘extreme-bias’ cases
where alternately qrqK =0and rtK =0 . In the former case, where productivity gains
are located exclusively in the tradable sector, the real exchange rate will unambiguously
appreciate for any non-negative income elasticity, while in the latter (where productivity
gains are located exclusively in the non-tradable sector) condition (17) becomes




Taken together, these results highlight the principal aggregate eﬀects of aid we explore
in the remainder of the paper. They indicate that in the presence of productivity
eﬀects the dynamic evolution of the equilibrium real exchange rate is ambiguous but
that in the conﬁguration which characterizes the current aid environment in low income
countries — where substantial aid ﬁnanced public expenditure is targeted to improving
the productivity of the non-tradable sector and where income elasticities of demand for
non-tradable goods such as basic food are low — then the initial appreciation is likely to
be followed by a subsequent equilibrium depreciation of the real exchange rate.
3. The simulation model
This model is necessarily highly stylized. It assumes ﬁxed private resource endowments,
a highly simpliﬁed government structure, and focuses only on aggregate consumption.
To give greater substance to its central mechanisms, to oﬀer a sense of the magnitude oft h ep o s s i b l ee ﬀects policy makers are likely to confront, and to unpack some ﬁrst-order
distributional consequences of the aid and public expenditure interaction, we construct
a small recursively dynamic computable general equilibrium model calibrated to reﬂect
the principal features of contemporary Uganda. In this section we provide a brief sketch
of the features of the simulation model; the properties of the data calibration employed
in the simulations are summarized in Appendix II.8
We use a real (barter) model of a small open economy enjoying no market power
in world markets, either for its imports or exports, so that the terms of trade are
independent of domestic policy choices. The terms of trade are thus held constant
across the range of experiments. The production side of the model is standard. Firms
in each of the four productive sectors, food-crop agriculture, cash crops, manufacturing
and services, are assumed to be perfectly competitive, producing a single good which
can be sold to either the domestic or export markets. Production functions in each
sector are Cobb-Douglas of the form




where sectoral subscripts are suppressed. The factors S,L,KP,a n dKG denote land,
labour (consisting of skilled and unskilled labour), sector-speciﬁc private capital and
infrastructure respectively. Only production in the rural sectors requires land which
is ﬁxed in perpetuity. Private sector-speciﬁc capital is ﬁx e di ne a c hp e r i o d ,b u tc a n
be augmented over time, so that labour is the only variable factor in the short run.
Labour is ﬁxed in aggregate but is mobile across sectors and at the margin is paid the
value of its marginal product. Private sector output is also determined by the level
of infrastructure, KG, which is provided by government. In keeping with the model
in Section 2, infrastructure is a public good capable of augmenting the productivity of
private factors in all sectors. Constant returns to scale prevail in the private factors of
production, but increasing returns are possible in the presence of public infrastructure.
Producers and consumers are price takers in world markets. Domestic production
and imports are imperfect substitutes in consumption while gross output is imperfectly
substitutable between domestic and export markets, with both relationships governed by
homothetic constant elasticity of substitution and transformation functions respectively.
Sector-speciﬁc real exchange rates for consumers and producers can therefore be tracked
independently.
The distributional consequences of aid and public expenditure are tracked though
their impact on three diﬀerent households, diﬀerentiated by their factor ownership and
patterns of consumption and saving. The ﬁrst is a ‘rural’ household, which is primarily
involved in food-crop agriculture (it owns the land and capital in this sector) but it
8The full model and calibration data are available on request from the authors.also supplies unskilled labour to the cash crop sector. This household is outside the
direct tax net, and has zero net savings.9 The second household is the ‘urban unskilled’
household whose only factor of production is unskilled labour which it supplies to the
manufacturing, services and government sectors. It owns no capital or land, has zero
(gross and) net savings, but in contrast to the rural household it does pay direct taxes.
Finally the ‘urban-skilled’ household supplies skilled labour to the manufacturing, ser-
vices and public sectors and owns the remainder of the land and capital in the economy.
This household pays direct taxes to government, at a higher rate than the unskilled
household, earns interest on its net holdings of government domestic debt, and has a
non-zero but constant propensity to save out of disposable income.
Consumption for each household type is deﬁned in terms of a constant elasticity of
substitution linear expenditure system (CES-LES) of the form


















i ∈ j (21)
where goods are denoted i and j and households h, pci i st h en e tp r i c eo ft h ec o m p o s i t e
good i, yd denotes household disposable income, β(i,h) household-speciﬁc consumption
shares, and b(i,h) household-speciﬁc subsistence consumption of good i,w h i c hm u s tb e
met prior to any discretionary allocation of income. The CES aspect means that con-
sumers are not indiﬀerent (in utility terms) between diﬀerent goods in their consumption
bundle but rather face a constant elasticity of substitution (denoted by ϕ) between each
good and the rest of the consumption aggregate. The LES aspect allows for the in-
come elasticity of demand for diﬀerent goods to deviate from unity. In the simulations
reported in the next section, we restrict our attention to the case where only food con-
sumption is subject to a subsistence threshold. This implies that the marginal income
elasticity of demand for food is less than unity and the income elasticity of demand for
all other goods (manufactured goods and services) is greater than unity.10
This structure of consumption underpins households’ utility which is deﬁned as the
product of private consumption, deﬁned in (21),and the level of public good provision
in the economy, Xpub (which is assumed to be valued equally by all household types).















9Gross savings in this sector are exactly equal to the depreciation of agricultural capital.
10Since cash crops are produced solely for export, ﬁnal household consumption is deﬁned over food,
manufactures and services only.where hw represents household weights based on the (ﬁxed) relative size of each
household type and βg is the weight of public consumption in total private sector utility.
Government policy decisions impact the private sector through a number of chan-
nels, only some of which we consider in this paper. We do not examine the consequences
of changes to the structure of taxation, nor to changes in direct transfers and interest
costs. These are kept constant throughout all experiments. Instead we focus entirely on
changes to public expenditure and in particular the balance between investment in in-
frastructure and the provision of government services. All public expenditure will have
direct aggregate demand eﬀects, but infrastructure investment also directly aﬀects the
supply side of the economy by augmenting private sector productivity, possibly diﬀer-
entially across sectors depending on the composition of their production. Government
sector-speciﬁc investment (in government oﬃces, schools, hospitals etc.) obviously inﬂu-
ences the cost of producing public services (by altering the marginal product of labour),
while direct current expenditure on public services has only pure demand side eﬀects.11
Current government savings are applied to government capital formation which is allo-
cated between sector-speciﬁc investment (i.e. in government building etc.) and public
infrastructure. The shortfall/excess of government savings relative to the cost of gov-
ernment capital formation is ﬁnanced from foreign savings or by directly crowding out
private investment.
The model has a simple recursively dynamic structure. Each solution run tracks
the economy over 10 periods from the initial policy change, and each period may be
thought of as a ﬁscal year. Within each year public and private capital stocks are taken
as given and the model is solved given the parameters of the experiment (e.g. the
increased aid ﬂows and the corresponding public expenditure decision being analyzed).
This solution deﬁnes a new vector of prices and quantities for the economy, including
the level of public and private sector investment. This feeds into the dynamic equation
for investment
Ki,t = Ki,t−1(1 − µi)+∆Ki,t−1 (23)
where µi denotes the rate of depreciation and hence determines the new capital stock
available to the economy at the beginning of the following year. In order to focus
exclusively on the impact of increased aid ﬂows on the economy we calibrate the model
to an initial equilibrium in which net public and private investment is zero (i.e. gross
investment exactly matches depreciation) and there is no growth in the labour supply.
11It is reasonable to assume that there are long-run returns to recurrent public expenditure on health
and education so that the value of this expenditure is also felt on the supply side. The simulation
model does not, however, reﬂect this feedback. We take the view that this feedback is relatively slow.
Accordingly our simulations reﬂect a “medium-term” in which adjustment to the physical capital stock
takes place but where changes to the human capital stock have not yet materialized. The utility
generated from public services, which are not purchased through the market and hence do not enter
private expenditure decisions (equation (21)), is reﬂected through the term Xpub in equation (22).The baseline therefore represents a steady-state equilibrium for the economy.
We adopt a neoclassical closure which constrains total investment to equal the level
of domestic savings. This closure rule is consistent with conditions in Uganda where
unrationed access to world capital markets is virtually zero and domestic savings (in
aggregate) are relatively interest inelastic. Hence total household and government sav-
ings are augmented by an exogenously determined level of foreign savings (aid), and
together these three determine the total resources available for gross investment. Once
total public sector investment requirements have been met, the residual investment is
allocated across sectors in proportion to the diﬀerential between the sectoral real rate
of return and the economy wide average private return on capital.
4. Experiments and Results
4.1. Simulation Experiments
T h ed a t au s e dt oc a l i b r a t et h eC G Em o d e la r edescribed in Appendix II and summarized
in Appendix Table 1. As noted above, we focus our attention mainly on one basic
experiment and consider the consequences of varying a number of key assumptions about
the functioning of the economy. The experiment is concerned with the consequences of a
permanent 12.5 percent increase in the net (grant) aid inﬂow to the economy, equivalent
to just under 2 percent of GDP at baseline domestic prices. This increase is roughly
the size of the increase in net aid ﬂows to Uganda between 2000 and 2002.
Given our focus on public investment we limit our attention to alternative domestic
ﬁscal responses to the increase in aid. In practice, the government may decide to take
all the adjustment on the side of expenditure, by increasing current expenditure or in-
frastructure investment, for example, or to oﬀs e tp a r to fi tb ya l t e r i n gt h er a t eo fr e v e n u e
mobilization. Some combination of both is likely to be optimal in many circumstances,
especially if current tax structures are highly distortionary at the margin and there are
limitations to the public sector’s absorptive capacity. However, in order to focus exclu-
sively on variations in the public expenditure programme, our simulations take the tax
structure as given; any consequent changes in the domestic budget balance after grants
is ﬁnanced through a direct crowding-out or crowding-in of private investment.
In the core experiment the incremental aid ﬂow is used to ﬁnance an increase in
infrastructure investment. In this experiment we make a range of assumptions about
how the investment aﬀects the private productive sectors of the economy, and in partic-
ular what the consequences are for productive capacity in these sectors. Simulation 1
provides our benchmark, where the infrastructure investment has no productivity value
whatever: the economy’s total capital stock is increased but public capital does not
sustain higher private output. This allows us to isolate the pure demand side eﬀects of
the aid ﬂow. Simulation 2 examines the case where the investment does enhance privatesector productivity but these eﬀects are uniform across all sectors of the economy and
is represented by outward shift in each sector’s production possibility frontier between
domestic (non-tradable) and export (tradable) variants of the good. The remaining
permutations on the basic experiment (simulations 3 — 5) examine three central cases
where the productivity impact is still felt across all sectors but now embodies a bias
such that within each sector the shift in the production possibility frontier is skewed in
favour of either tradable or non-tradable production. Speciﬁcally, we consider only the
‘extreme-bias’ cases described in equations (17) and (19) above which are represented by
a rotation in the frontier around either end-point. Simulations 1 through 4 assume that
the subsistence component in consumption is zero so that the consumption side of the
economy is homothetic in income. In Simulation 5, however, we impose a subsistence
component for food consumption (equal to 90 percent of the initial consumption level)
so that the income elasticity of demand for food falls sharply below one.
Our second experiment is reported in simulation 6. Here we examine the eﬀect
of the same aid ﬂow being used exclusively to ﬁnance an increase in the volume of
public services, leaving infrastructure unchanged. Public service provision is enhanced
by increasing sector speciﬁc capital and recurrent expenditure (ultimately) in equal
proportions. Initially the enhanced aid ﬂow is used to raise capital to its new (stationary)
level, and then the ﬂow is used to hire the associated additional labour and intermediate
inputs to produce additional government current consumption.
It is assumed throughout that the government does not alter its tax structure but
does takes into account price changes in determining the volume of expenditure which
can be ﬁnanced with the additional aid. Hence the government is portrayed as setting
out to behave in a way which is (domestic) budget neutral. Second order changes in the
level of household income, demand, and relative price eﬀects arising from infra-marginal
government activities are not, however, internalized in the government’s decisions so that
the experiments are not budget neutral ex post.
For each experiment we report the impact eﬀect (year 1) and the cumulative evolu-
tion of the economy after 5 and 10 years. In order to simplify our presentation we focus
only on changes in a small number of key aggregates. These are: (i) the export-weighted
real exchange rate ; (ii) the volume of exports and imports and the domestic good supply;
(iii) real GDP; (iv) private investment; (v) the ﬁscal accounts; and (vi) the real dispos-
able income of our three household types, measured in terms of the household-speciﬁc
consumption price index. For a given level of government expenditure real disposable
income is a direct measure of household welfare, although as we discuss below, when the
level of government current expenditure is altered this measure understates true wel-
fare. These summary results are presented in Table 1, and the experiments are ranked
according to various criteria in Table 2.4.2. Results
*** Table 1 here ***
Experiment 1 provides a benchmark for what follows. Here the infrastructure in-
vestment confers no beneﬁts on private productivity so that in terms of the model in
Section 2, qrqK = rtK =0 . Hence the aid ﬂow has little initial impact on GDP, but it
does lead to an appreciation of the export real exchange rate and a sizeable contraction
in exports in favour of higher production of domestic goods. The higher permanent level
of aid necessarily implies an increased current account deﬁcit, so that total imports rise
despite the decline in private export earnings. In contrast to the endowment model of
Section 2, the evolution of the simulated economy over the medium-term points to a
progressive deterioration in overall economic performance as a result of a decline in real
private sector investment. In part this reﬂects a decline in total savings as the ﬁscal
balance deteriorates, which in turn reﬂects the adverse eﬀects of the real exchange rate
on the budget.12 However the main reason for the decline in real investment is that the
real exchange rate appreciation raises the cost of capital goods (since capital formation
is intensive in non-tradable services). This means that although the real exchange rate
appreciation moderates over time the deterioration of the capital stock ensures that
the decline in export performance does not reverse and hence the initial welfare gains
weaken over time. Finally it is worth noting that in this simulation while total real
income increases, rural households actually suﬀer a decline in their income. This is
an important result and, as will be seen, recurs across all simulations to a greater or
lesser degree. The principal reason for this outcome is that the demand eﬀects from
increased government expenditure (either capital or current) fall disproportionately on
urban skilled and unskilled labour and on intermediate goods from the manufacturing
and services sectors. In other words, backward linkages from the formal urban sectors
(manufacturing, services and government) to the rural sectors (food and cash-crops)
are extremely weak. As later results show, these demand eﬀects are exacerbated in
circumstances when relative price eﬀects turn against the rural sector, and the income
elasticity of demand for food is low.
By contrast, in Experiment 2 government infrastructure investment raises private-
sector productivity uniformly across sectors although the productivity eﬀect is unbiased
between the domestic goods and exportable sectors. There is now a fairly substantial
cumulative growth in GDP over the ten years, some improvement in the ﬁscal balance,
and a marked increase in private investment.13 As a consequence, while the impact
eﬀects on the real exchange rate and on exports are very similar to experiment 1,
12Since government is a net seller of foreign exchange, the real exchange rate appreciation reduces the
domestic value of the budget balance and therefore increases the domestic ﬁnancing requirement.
13Government revenue grows as real incomes and expenditures grow while, after the initial step change,
real government spending does not. Savings available for private investment grow partly with GDP butthey diverge sharply over time. Over the medium-term most of the real exchange rate
appreciation has been reversed, but more importantly, even though the real exchange
rate remains appreciated relative to its baseline value, the initial 6 percent fall in exports
is reversed, moving to a 4 percent increase over the baseline by the end of the simulation.
While the impact eﬀects on household incomes are the same as in the previous
experiment, matters improve over time so that not only is total real income more than
4 percent higher over the long run but the previously poor and declining position of
rural households has been reversed. Rural households enjoy an increase in real income
over time in this experiment, even though their gain is appreciably lower than that of
the urban households.
Experiments 3 and 4 consider the likely outcome if the productivity gains witnessed
in Experiment 2 are biased towards the production of tradable (exportable) or non-
tradable (domestic goods).14 In the former case, considered in Experiment 3, while the
productivity eﬀect is again positive and uniform across sectors, it is now biased within
the food and manufacturing sectors in favour of export production. As expected, there
is no increase in the productivity of non-tradable production, this powerfully exacer-
bates the RER appreciation. The adverse export supply response is equally marked
for the cash-crop sector with the long-run export growth in this sector only 1.6 percent
above baseline compared with 4.1 percent in the previous experiment. By contrast,
although manufacturing exports suﬀer in the short- to medium-term from the more ap-
preciated real exchange rate, the export-biased productivity gains are powerful enough
to oﬀset this eﬀect so that in the long-run export supply performance is better than in
Experiment 2.
When the productivity gain is biased entirely towards the production of the domestic
good, as shown in Experiment 4, outcomes are markedly diﬀerent. The bias in produc-
tion (which increases the supply of non-tradable goods) is suﬃciently strong to almost
entirely oﬀset the demand eﬀects of the increased aid ﬂows so that the real exchange
rate movement is more or less neutral.15 The eﬀects on exports are symmetrical with
Experiment 3; cash-crop exports fall by less initially and recover more strongly than in
earlier experiments, but the domestic bias in manufacturing productivity results in a
greater initial decline and more sluggish recovery in manufacturing exports.
The domestic-biased supply response leads to a larger improvement in the long-
also because of ‘crowding-in’ from the improvement in the ﬁscal balance. It is a consequence of the
closure rule mentioned earlier that these resources are duly invested.
14Since the cash-crop sector is exclusively an export sector and the public and private services sectors
wholly non-tradable, this switch in the bias of productivity gains is only meaningful in the context of
the food crop and manufacturing sectors.
15Notice that the model in Section 2 predicts that the real exchange rate change should be exactly
zero. That it is not so in the simulation model reﬂects its richer structure including the fact that the
government budget is not invariant to changes in the real exchange rate.run ﬁscal balance (of 0.6 percentage points of GDP) reﬂecting favourable relative price
movements and higher growth, higher long-run private investment and higher real GDP
growth than either the neutral or export-biased forms of productivity growth.
The most striking diﬀerence between these two experiments, though, is the eﬀect on
real household disposable incomes. Compared to the case of a neutral supply response,
a strong export bias in the productivity gain induced by infrastructure expenditure
sharply moderates real income growth in the economy. Long-run total income rises by
only 2.1 percent over its baseline compared to 4.5 percent when the supply response is
neutral between exports and domestic production. However, the income gain is spread
relatively equally across household groups. This contrasts sharply with the domestic-
biased supply response which generates a markedly higher aggregate real income gain
of 7 percent in the long-run but one that is disproportionately skewed in favour of the
urban households.
As noted above, the tendency for urban households to gain disproportionately from
aid-ﬁnanced increases in infrastructure partly reﬂects the low backward linkages from
government expenditure to the rural sector of the economy. The relative price move-
ments underpinning Experiment 4 exacerbate these weak linkages. As the economy’s
increased ability to produce domestic goods reverses the real exchange rate appreciation
this shifts the domestic terms of trade in favour of those consuming the now relatively
cheaper domestic goods (all households) and against those producing them (the rural
household). Rural households thus share more or less equally in the consumption gain
from lower-cost domestic goods but share disproportionately in the income loss from
producing them.
In Experiments 2 and 4 these adverse distributional eﬀects are weak enough not to
oﬀset the rural household’s share in the aggregate income gain for the economy. This
is not the case, however, in Experiment 5. This experiment repeats the previous one,
but assumes that there is a high subsistence requirement in food consumption for all
households. The implication of this is that having met this requirement, positive income
gains will be allocated disproportionately away from food expenditure so that on the
margin the income elasticity of demand for food will be less than unity, and increasingly
so the higher is the subsistence threshold, and vice versa for the other sectors. The
eﬀect of this minor adjustment to assumed consumer behaviour is dramatic; the real
exchange rate now initially depreciates sharply and remains more depreciated than
the baseline throughout the simulation run. Similarly after a small initial fall, export
volumes increase substantially, as does the ﬁscal balance, private investment and real
GDP. In all cases the gains are greater than in any of the other experiments. The same
holds for aggregate real income which increases by 8.6 percent over the baseline in the
long-run.
The distributional impact in this experiment is rather unpleasant, though. Urban
households enjoy substantial real income gains as a result of the decline in food prices,while rural households experience large income falls. The reason is simple; in this
experiment the adverse shift in the internal terms of trade against rural households noted
under Experiment 4 is magniﬁed by the low income elasticity of demand in consumption
from all households. Rural households suﬀer twice over in this case, ﬁrst from the fall
in prices of food and second from the weakness of the demand for food as a result of
the low income elasticity, which drives food prices even lower.16
In the ﬁnal Experiment 6, we move away from considering the eﬀects of increased
infrastructure investment to examine the case where the aid inﬂow is used exclusively to
increase production of the public service. Since by construction there are no spillovers
onto private sector productivity in this experiment the simulation is rather similar to
experiment 1 (wasteful investment), at least initially. Over the longer-run, this experi-
ment leads to a marginally larger domestic ﬁscal deﬁcit, lower private investment and
lower long-run real GDP growth.17
The movement of real incomes also closely matches the outcome for Experiment
1. As with infrastructure, the production of public services is relatively intensive in
urban skilled labour and so beneﬁts urban workers relative to rural ones. There is one
important caveat in this case, though. As we noted in our discussion of household welfare
above, households directly derive utility from the consumption of government services.
By reporting only the real consumption income component of household welfare Table
2 understates any implicit valuation of the increased volume of public services produced
under this experiment. Given the parameterization of the model, the valuation of this
increase is unlikely to exceed 1-1.5 percent of income for each household type. Factoring
in this valuation would reinforce the welfare gains of urban households; it would be
insuﬃcient to fully compensate for the decline in rural incomes.18
4.3. Summary
The mass of detail in Table 1, even though it represents an extremely concise summary
of the full output from the model, is diﬃcult to digest. Table 2 attempts to ‘summarize
the summary’, by ranking the experiments, at 1 year and at 10 years, in terms of
16It is exactly this mechanism that Matsuyama (1992) identiﬁes as generating the surplus labour and
rising real consumption wages in manufacturing necessary to fuel industrialization in his closed economy
model.
17We assume that the government designs its expansion of expenditure to be budget-neutral ex ante
and hence factors in the impact of its additional expenditure on its price. However we assume that the
existing volume of expenditure represents ‘real’ commitments. The eﬀect of relative price movements on
this inframarginal component of government expenditure is therefore not anticipated in the experiment.
It is these relative price movements which alter ﬁscal outcomes.
18Assuming, of course, that each household type values government expenditure equally. Only if this
valuation diﬀered greatly between household types, in particular it was much more highly valued by
rural households, would these results change.their impact on various magnitudes of concern to recipients and donors. These are
the real exchange rate (from maximum appreciation down to maximum depreciation),
export volume, real income of rural households, real income overall, real GDP, private
investment and the ﬁscal balance. The additional ﬁgures for the real exchange rate,
exports and GDP report the corresponding general equilibrium elasticities with respect
to aid.
*** Table 2 ***
There are ﬁve qualitative conclusions from this exercise. First, there is a broad
similarity between the rankings for both impact and long run eﬀects, with the notable
exception of the export-biased experiment (experiment 3). An increase in aid in the
presence of an export-biased supply response has an adverse impact eﬀect on the econ-
omy, but improves markedly over time. The second main conclusion is that the presence
of a domestic-bias in the aggregate supply response (experiments 4 and 5) is broadly
beneﬁcial to the economy, in terms of aggregate growth and investment, welfare, ex-
ports and in moderating the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Third, in general
across all experiments, and particularly when there is a domestic-good bias in the supply
response, the rural household does not share proportionately in the aggregate income
gains to the economy. Fourth, the combination of a domestic bias in production and
a high subsistence requirement in food (experiment 5) delivers a large supply response
which dominates the other cases, were it not for its highly adverse distributional ef-
fects. Fifth, there are potentially substantial payoﬀsv i aa ni m p r o v e dﬁscal balance
and increased private investment in all the experiments involving uniform eﬀects across
sectors, regardless of the presence or absence of bias (experiments 2-5).
As indicated by the elasticities these eﬀects are sizeable. With the exception of
e x p e r i m e n t5a ni n c r e a s ei nn e ta i d ,r e g a r d l e s so fi t su s e ,w i l ll e a dt oa na p p r e c i a t i o no f
the export real exchange rate with an elasticity of between 0.1 and 0.5, and a decline in
total exports with an elasticity of around 0.5. In the short-run, of course, this decline
in exports reﬂects a pure reallocation eﬀect; there is no substantial growth in total real
GDP. Over the long-run, however, the real exchange rate and export supply elasticities
moderate sharply (with the latter turning positive for experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5) while
the output elasticity rises to almost 0.3 for the same experiments. Only in the case
where the aid is devoted exclusively to higher current government expenditure, or if
infrastructure investment fails to deliver any productivity gains at all, does real GDP
remain stagnant.
5. Conclusion
The basic conclusion of this paper is that beyond the short-run, in which demand-side
eﬀects dominate, the relation between enhanced aid ﬂows, real exchange rates, exportvolumes and welfare is a complex one. It is certainly not inevitable that over a medium
term horizon concerns about the Dutch disease eﬀects of aid are warranted. The key to
the evolution of the aggregate economy is obviously the supply-side response to the aid-
funded public expenditure; we have indicated that productivity enhancements that are
skewed towards the production of domestic goods deliver the largest aggregate return
to aid.
Such productivity biases however also exacerbate a key underlying distributional ten-
sion. Public expenditure is intensive in formal sector (urban) employment and draws
disproportionately on the manufactured goods and services sectors for its intermediate
inputs. Rural households capture little of the direct beneﬁt from these demand factors.
On the other hand, if supply side eﬀects are powerful enough that domestic food prices
fall relative to manufacturing and service prices, and if these are reinforced by a low
income elasticity of demand for food, rural household incomes suﬀer, possibly absolutely
as well as relative to urban households. These adverse distributional eﬀects have the
potential to undermine the aggregate gains from productivity-enhancing public expen-
diture. This result, as with the others in this paper, emerges from a simulation model
and is therefore only illustrative. Nonetheless it is of suﬃcient strength to suggest that
close attention needs to be paid to the evolving distributional consequences of the public
expenditure programme.
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Appendix I. Derivation of Conditions (7) to (9).
Totally diﬀerentiating (1) to (3) and noting from (2) that (EP
Q +EG
Q −RQ)dQ =0we get
EP
UdU + EG
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From the market clearing condition for the non-tradable sector we know that EQ = EP
Q+EG
Q =






as the government share in the total demand for
non-tradables. We also deﬁne γ =
QEG
Q
E as the share of government expenditure on non-
tradables as a proportion of total (national) expenditure, and φ = EG
E as the share of total
government expenditure in national expenditure. Finally we deﬁne the following quantities:
ΣQQ =
QRQQ





Q < 0 is the private sector’s elasticity of demand for non-tradables with





Q < 0 is the corresponding public sector






> 0 is the private sector’s income elasticity of demand for






> 0 the corresponding elasticity for the public sector (see
Dixit and Norman (1980), chapter 2).
Multiplying and dividing by QRQ = Q(EP
Q + EG










Turning to the right hand side of (A5), using the deﬁnitions of the income elasticities, collecting























The term in dA follows from the expression for ΛG Substituting this, (A6) and (A7) into (A5)
gives (7). Conditions (8) and (9) follow by simple substitution.
Appendix II. Data and parameter calibration
No oﬃcial social accounting matrix currently exists for Uganda. Hence, drawing on a range
of oﬃcial sources, we have created a representative baseline SAM, calibrated to the ﬁscal-year
2000/01. Despite its synthetic character this SAM is a reasonable representation of the principal
structural features of the Ugandan economy. The cash-crop sector is a pure export sector, and
private services completely non-tradable. By contrast, there is two-way trade in both the food
and manufacturing sectors. Both are net importers, although the latter is signiﬁcantly more
import-intensive than the former. We take the view that in both sectors the export share in
current output is low relative to its optimum (as a result of two decades or more of anti-export
biases in trade policy) so that the elasticity of substitution between supplying domestic and
export markets should be set relatively high, and certainly greater than unity. We experimented
initially with a range of values between 1 and 5 settling eventually on a value of 2.
Aggregate investment demand is more or less equally intensive in services (construction)
and manufactured goods, although government infrastructure investment is rather more service-
intensive than is private sector investment. As discussed in Section 3, output is characterized by
constant returns to scale in private factors (land, labour and capital), but increasing returns in
the presence of public infrastructure capital, measured by αg. There are no reliable empirical
estimates, either for Uganda or elsewhere, with which to calibrate this parameter. We therefore
choose a value of αg =0 .5 which has the property that public capital is as productive as privatecapital in producing agricultural output but less productive than private capital in producing
manufactured goods and services.19
As expected, given Uganda’s level of income, private ﬁnal consumption is dominated by food
(58 percent) with the balance spread across manufactured goods (including petroleum products)
and services. This balance is similar across the three household types although the food share
in consumption is highest in the rural household (67 percent) and lowest in the urban-skilled
household (42 percent). Consumers are assumed to have relatively low elasticities of substitution
in consumption (the elasticities are set to 0.5 for each good), implying that the income eﬀect
of relative price movements dominates the substitution eﬀect. Thus adverse terms of trade
movements, for example, will lead to a depreciation of the import real exchange rate and vice
versa for a positive terms of trade movements.
Government expenditure spans three broad categories. In the baseline approximately 40
percent is recurrent expenditure; a further 50 percent is categorized as infrastructure investment,
and the balance as sector-speciﬁc public-sector capital formation.
19Sensitivity analysis based on alternative values for αg is available on request from the au-
thors.TABLE 1:  SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE EFFECT OF A 12.5 PERCENT  INCREASE IN NET AID FLOWS [1,2]. 
Experiment  123456
Productivity Bias [3] Neutral E-bias D-bias D-bias
Subsistence Consumption [4] Food  
PRICES AND QUANTITIES Time Period
Export Weighted RER  [5] to t=1 -2.6% -2.6% -5.8% 0.9% 5.0% -2.0%
to  t=5 -2.0% -1.6% -2.6% -0.5% 0.2% -1.8%
to t = 10 -2.1% -0.7% -1.8% 0.4% 1.4% -1.5%
Total Exports to t=1 -6.2% -6.2% -6.7% -5.7% -2.8% -6.7%
to  t=5 -6.4% -2.6% -3.3% -1.9% 2.2% -7.4%
to t = 10 -6.7% 4.2% 3.2% 5.3% 11.7% -7.9%
Manufacturing Exports to t=1 -6.0% -6.0% -5.1% -6.8% -7.4% -6.8%
to  t=5 -6.2% -3.0% -2.0% -3.3% -4.2% -8.1%
to t = 10 -6.9% 4.2% 4.7% 3.9% 2.3% -9.0%
Cash crop Exports to t=1 -6.9% -6.9% -8.5% -5.2% -1.0% -6.9%
to  t=5 -7.0% -3.1% -4.9% -1.1% 4.9% -7.2%
to t = 10 -7.2% 4.1% 1.6% 6.4% 16.1% -7.7%
Total Imports t=1 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 2.1% 3.3% 1.7%
t=5 1.8% 3.2% 3.0% 3.5% 5.2% 1.5%
to t = ss 1.7% 5.8% 5.4% 6.2% 8.8% 1.3%
Total Domestic Goods Supply to t=1 0.6% 0.6% -0.6% 1.9% 2.0% 0.7%
to  t=5 0.5% 2.2% 0.9% 3.6% 3.7% 0.7%
to t = 10 0.4% 5.1% 3.7% 6.7% 7.0% 0.5%
Real GDP to t=1 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0%
to  t=5 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.0%
to t = 10 -0.1% 3.3% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% -0.3%
Private Investment to t=1 -3.2% -3.2% -5.2% -1.1% 0.8% -4.2%
to  t=5 -2.6% 2.3% 0.2% 4.6% 7.4% -4.9%
to t = 10 -2.9% 11.2% 8.8% 13.8% 18.3% -5.5%
FISCAL ACCOUNTS [2]
Total Revenue  to t=1 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0%
to  t=5 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% 1.1% 0.0%
to t = 10 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.2% 1.6% 0.0%
Total Current Expenditure  to t=1 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.9%
to  t=5 0.0% -0.3% -0.4% -0.2% 0.7% 2.0%
to t = 10 0.0% -0.8% -0.8% -0.7% 0.6% 2.1%
Domestic Budget Balance to t=1 -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.3% -0.1% -0.5%
to  t=5 -0.4% -0.1% -0.2% 0.1% 0.3% -0.6%
to t = 10 -0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0% -0.6%
REAL DISPOSABLE INCOME
Rural to t=1 -1.4% -1.4% -2.3% -0.6% -6.5% -1.6%
to  t=5 -1.5% 0.2% -0.9% 1.2% -7.3% -1.9%
to t = 10 -1.8% 3.6% 2.2% 4.9% -7.7% -2.4%
Urban - Unskilto t=1 2.1% 2.1% -1.1% 5.5% 10.7% 2.1%
to  t=5 2.1% 3.3% 0.1% 6.7% 14.4% 2.0%
to t = 10 2.0% 5.1% 1.9% 8.6% 20.6% 1.9%
Urban -Skilled to t=1 1.8% 1.8% -1.3% 5.1% 10.9% 2.1%
to  t=5 1.8% 3.1% 0.0% 6.4% 14.8% 2.3%
to t = 10 1.9% 5.2% 2.0% 8.5% 21.5% 2.4%
Total to t=1 0.5% 0.5% -1.7% 2.7% 3.3% 0.5%
to  t=5 0.4% 1.9% -0.4% 4.2% 5.1% 0.4%
to t = 10 0.3% 4.5% 2.1% 7.0% 8.6% 0.2%
NOTES
[1] All experiments consider a permanent increase in net aid inflows of 12.5%, equivalent to 1.97% of initial GDP. 
In Experiments 1 through 5 this increase is applied to infrastructure investment, raising infrastructure capital by 1.3% in 
the first year. By year 10 the infrastructure stock is 9.5% higher than in the baseline.  In experiment 6 the aid is used to
 increase government current expenditure and sector-specific capital. This entails an initial increase in sector-specific
capital stock by 5.6% (effective in t=2). Thereafter total expenditure is allocated between current and capital expenditure
so as to maintain the capital-output ratio constant.  This is consistent with an increase in government expenditure of 11.4%
[2] Values reported as changes relative to baseline except for fiscal measures which are reported as percentage points of GDP
[3] Denotes whether the productivity enhancement is biased towards domestic or export production. 
[4] Indicates the presence of a sector-specific subsistence level of consumption (as %age of baseline consumption) .
[5] The real exchange rate is defined as (pe/pd) so that negative values indicate an appreciation.TABLE 2.  SUMMARY RANKING OF SIMULATION OUTCOMES BY KEY INDICATORS
(a) Impact Effect (t=1)
Ref ERER Elast Ref Exp Elast Ref RGDP Elast Ref PINV Ref YD-Rural Ref YD-Tot Ref BDEF
3 E -5.8% -0.46 3 E -6.7% -0.54 3 E -0.02% 0.00 3 E -5.2% 5 DS -6.5% 3 E -1.7% 3 E -0.54%
1 -2.6% -0.21 6 -6.7% -0.53 6 0.00% 0.00 6 -4.2% 3 E -2.3% 1 0.5% 6 -0.49%
2 -2.6% -0.02 1 -6.2% -0.50 1 0.06% 0.00 1 -3.2% 6 -1.6% 2 0.5% 1 -0.41%
6 -2.0% -0.16 2 -6.2% -0.50 2 0.06% 0.00 2 -3.2% 1 -1.4% 6 0.5% 2 -0.41%
4 D 0.9% -0.07 4 D -5.7% -0.45 4 D 0.14% 0.01 4 D -1.1% 2 -1.4% 4 D 2.7% 4 D -0.28%
5 DS 5.0% 0.40 5 DS -2.8% -0.22 5 DS 0.30% 0.02 5 DS 0.8% 4 D -0.6% 5 DS 3.3% 5 DS -0.11%
[b] Long Run Effect (t=10)
Ref ERER Elast Ref Exp Elast Ref RGDP Elast Ref PINV Ref YD-Rural Ref YD-Tot Ref BDEF
1 -2.1% -0.17 6 -7.9% -0.64 6 -0.25% -0.02 6 -5.5% 5 DS -7.7% 6 0.2% 6 -0.58%
3 E -1.8% -0.14 1 -6.7% -0.54 1 -0.13% -0.01 1 -2.9% 6 -2.4% 1 0.3% 1 -0.37%
6 -1.5% -0.12 3 E 3.2% 0.26 3 E 3.12% 0.25 3 E 8.8% 1 -1.8% 3 E 2.1% 3 E 0.28%
2 -0.7% -0.06 2 4.2% 0.34 2 3.25% 0.26 2 11.2% 3 E 2.2% 2 4.5% 2 0.42%
4 D 0.4% 0.03 4 D 5.3% 0.42 4 D 3.38% 0.27 4 D 13.8% 2 3.6% 4 D 7.0% 4 D 0.56%
5 DS 1.4% 0.11 5 DS 11.7% 0.93 5 DS 3.61% 0.29 5 DS 18.3% 4 D 4.9% 5 DS 8.6% 5 DS 0.98%
Notes
[1]  Ref denotes the experiments defined in the text and reported in Table 1. Each block ranks the set of experiments in ascending order of impact on the indicator.  
[2] ERER denotes the export real exchange rate; Exp total exports ; RGDP real GDP ;  PINV private investment; YD-Rural rural real disposable income ; 
YD-Total total real disposable income ; BDEF domestic budget deficit (after grants) and Elast the elasticity with respect to aid.
[3]  E  denotes export-bias in supply response ; D denotes a domestic-good bias in supply response ; S denotes the presence of subsistence consumption in food sector.Appendix Table 1: Representative Uganda SAM Fiscal Year 2000/01




GNY 9409 117% Import Net Cons
Sectors X XD E M Duties Exports ND ID CD Taxes
Exports 17.4% Food Crops 5107 4984 123 631 13 -508 780 30 4818 80
Cash Crops 640 30 610 0 0 610 20 10 0 0
Imports 47.0% Manufacturing 3647 2982 665 3146 447 -2481 4184 549 1842 100
Services 5612 5612 0000 3331 621 1660 175
Trade 64.4% Public Services 1345 1345 00000000
Net Factor Income from abroad 15.5% Total  16351 14953 1398 3777 460 -2379 8315 1210 8320 355
Current Account (before aid)  -14.1% As share of Total
Aid  15.8% Food Crops 31.2% 33.3% 8.8% 16.7% 2.8% 21.4% 9.4% 2.5% 57.9% 22.5%
Cash Crops 3.9% 0.2% 43.6% 0.0% 0.0% -25.6% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Reserve Accumulation   1.7% Manufacturing 22.3% 19.9% 47.6% 83.3% 97.2% 104.3% 50.3% 45.4% 22.1% 28.2%
Services 34.3% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.1% 51.3% 20.0% 49.3%
Private Consumption 103.5% Public Services 8.2% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Private Investment 8.1% As share of X by sector (factor cost)
Depreciation 8.1% Food Crops 100.0% 97.6% 2.4% 12.6% -10.2% 15.3% 0.6% 94.3%
Cash Crops 100.0% 4.7% 95.3% 0.0% 95.3% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0%
Private Savings 5.7% Manufacturing 100.0% 81.8% 18.2% 98.5% -80.3% 114.7% 15.1% 50.5%
Services 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 59.4% 11.1% 29.6%
Government Revenue 13.6% Public Services 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Government Current Expenditure 18.4% Notes:
X Total Domestic Production (at factor cost)
Current Budget Balance  -4.8% XD Domestic Sales to Domestic Economy (X-E) (at factor cost)
E Exports (fob)
Government Investment 7.0% M Imports (cif)
CD Private consumption demand (factor cost)
Overall Deficit (before Aid)  -11.7% ND Intermediate demand (factor cost)
ID Investment demand (factor cost)
The SAM is specified in billions of Shillings with a nominal exchange rate ofUsh1750 per US$